Who is competing to become president of Iran in the second round of elections? | Election News

The election campaigns are almost finished, the debates have concluded and all that remains is the vote.

Saeed Jalili and Masoud Pezeshkian will compete in the second round of Friday’s presidential elections in Iran, after no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round, held on June 28.

The winner will become the new president of Iran, following the death of late president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19.

Who are the two remaining candidates in the race?

The second round will be contested by Saeed Jalili and Masoud Pezeshkian.

Jalili is best known internationally for his role in handling the Iranian nuclear lawsuit between 2007 and 2012, when he was the country’s uncompromising chief nuclear negotiator.

He currently serves as one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s direct representatives on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and has run unsuccessfully for president twice before.

Pezeshkian, a cardiac surgeon, has been a member of parliament since 2008 and was vice-president of parliament from 2016 to 2020. Furthermore, most of his government positions are related to the health sector – he was minister of health in the early 2000s and is a long-time member of the Iranian parliament’s health committee.

He tried to run for president in 2021, but was disqualified by the Guardianship Council.

What political fields do the candidates represent?

Jalili is a hard-line conservative, in the mold of his former ally, the late President Raisi. An anti-Western figure, his role in the SNSC allowed him to operate what he called a “parallel government” during moderate Hassan Rouhani’s period in office between 2013 and 2021.

Jalili was against the nuclear deal with the West in 2015 and would likely be unwilling to agree to Western terms to restore the deal if he became president. However, he promised to quickly reduce inflation – even if he did not go into detail about how he would do so.

Pezeshkian, on the other hand, is considered a moderate and has won the support of senior centrists and reformists within the Iranian establishment, such as former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani.

He says he will work to restore the 2015 nuclear deal and has also expressed his opposition to the state’s handling of protests, including the nationwide protests that have rocked Iran following the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in custody. police officer in 2022.

Which candidate represents Iran’s political establishment?

The first thing to note is that Iran’s political elite is not a single bloc, there are different centers of power that revolve around Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Both Jalili and Pezeshkian are long-time members of this establishment and loyal to the Iranian government – ​​even if Pezeshkian has more reformist tendencies.

Conservatives have tended to dominate Iran’s political establishment, especially in recent years, and many have rallied around Jalili.

Jalili and Pezeshkian support the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a pillar of the state’s military apparatus. Jalili is a former member of the IRGC and Pezeshkian has demonstrated his support for the organization in the past by wearing its uniform.

Pezeshkian also demonstrated his loyalty to Iran’s political system by not supporting anti-government protests, even if, as noted earlier, he criticized some aspects of the state’s response.

What was the result in the first round?

Pezeshkian emerged victorious, with 44.4% of the vote. Jalili got 40 percent, with the second-most voted candidate, conservative former Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, getting 14.4 percent. As no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, the top two candidates advanced to a second round.

The election saw record turnout, with just 40% of the more than 61 million eligible Iranians voting.

Does this mean Pezeshkian is the favorite?

Not necessarily. Ghalibaf, along with two other failed conservative candidates who won a small share of the vote, supported Jalili.

Pezeshkian’s chances lie in greater participation in the second round, which can only be achieved by convincing a sufficient number of centrist and reformist Iranians to vote.

On the one hand, many – especially in the reformist camp – will be unwilling to participate in the country’s political system, especially after the state’s crackdown on the anti-government protest movement. Pezeshkian’s continued support for the establishment may make many of them decide to stay home.

On the other hand, fears of a hard-line Jalili presidency may convince some reformist voters to participate, even if they are not entirely convinced by Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian’s chances depend on how many of these voters he is able to influence.