How Europe’s Diverging Artillery Munitions Complicate Support for Ukraine

As chief executive of the European Defense Agency, former Czech Defense Minister Jiří Šedivý helps shape the European Union’s voice on defense and security issues, which began to grow stronger even before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022. Since then, the agency has slowly transitioned from a facilitator of collaboration between Member States, with sometimes vague results, to a more hands-on broker of critical and urgently needed military equipment in Ukraine. He spoke to Defense News about the intricacies of designing a “menu” for purchasing 155-millimeter artillery shells, as well as increasing cooperation between the EU and NATO, which has remained stalled by a long-running dispute involving Turkey and Cyprus.

More than two years after the start of Russia’s invasion, what is the appetite of member states to cooperate on defense issues?

It was fast-paced and driven, that’s for sure. We see this in practice in many activities, which aim, first and foremost, to support Ukraine, but also to replenish it, reinforcing its own national stocks.

Defense ministers approved a new capability development plan in November last year, which stipulates capability development priorities, or European defense priorities. This is something that, compared to the previous iteration, which occurred in 2018, is now much more focused on cutting-edge capabilities, high-intensity operations, lessons learned or observed in Ukraine, and very complementary with NATO. It is now being worked through what we call capability prioritization roadmaps, to deliver concrete capabilities across the spectrum of domains.

We have had very positive feedback and this will really speed up cooperation, even from Member States that used to be a bit reluctant towards collaborative projects in the EU context.

Member States that are allies in NATO are much more socialized in NATO. But now we actually see that they understand that, in combination with various incentives that the EU provides – joint public procurement, but also for defense innovation, etc. – can obtain greater added value from our cadres, with our incentives, towards capabilities that are at the same time relevant to NATO.

What are these incentives?

Everything from the European Defense Fund, reimbursement from the European Peace Mechanism for equipment donated to the AU, to the yet-to-be-established European Defense Industrial Program, etc. The incentive, after all, is money. But there are also economies of scale that come from coming together in collaborative programs.

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There seemed to be a reflection in Europe, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, towards national decision-making, towards protectionism. It seems you didn’t notice that, then?

When the war began, very soon our Member States began delivering military material to Ukraine, and we quickly realized that this is truly a high-intensity war in Europe, unprecedented since the Second World War. That could become a war of attrition in the long term. That the volumes of consumption of military material – ammunition, in particular – are very demanding. Thus, national reserves began to quickly deplete as Member States made deliveries to Ukraine. And then there were the efforts to restock and, in fact, the initial instinct was national – to grab what is still on the shelves and available on the market. But then, with these incentives for joint acquisition, for example, we now see a change.

Look at what we do in terms of 155mm ammunition: 60 framework contracts, 10 Member States contracting through us. Our estimate is that the order volume is now around 350 million euros, which is not bad, given the current global appetite for 155 mm ammunition. But at the same time, we still have a lot of unused capacity under the framework contracts we have signed with industry.

So to your question, I think there was an initial reaction toward instinctual individualism. But now, as it always takes some time to develop these new frameworks and incentives, Member States are really ready to come together more than before.

Is the 155mm ammunition procurement mandate the largest purchasing task currently under your responsibility?

There are still many bilateral or national activities underway. There is also the concept of a lead nation, where Germany, Sweden and France have offered to open their own national framework contracts to interested Member States. There are activities in NATO, NSPA, etc. It is important to note that we are just one piece of the mosaic.

Joint contracting alone is not our primary task at EDA. We are not purchasing agents. We do not have a dedicated board to make purchases. So when we were approached by the Member State to carry out a swath of the European Union’s 155mm ammunition initiative, we had to reorganize a bit internally to be able to deliver. I have asked Member States several times to reinforce us, at least in terms of a temporary deployment of experts, without success.

In the end, we were able to conclude these framework contracts with the industry – issuing requests for information, addressing the relevant industrial players. Covers four types of howitzers. We have the French Caesar, the Polish Krab, the Slovak Zuzana and the German Panzerhaubitze 2000. There is no “one size fits all” solution.

And inside them, you have two types of projectiles: longer range and higher explosive. Additionally, there are four components, as few producers are able to deliver complete rounds.

If you put all of this together, you have a 36-slot array. And for these, we signed these 60 framework contracts. And all of this is done with about 12 people.

It’s a bit like member states are given a menu where you have starters, main courses etc., complete with prices, delivery times and everything else. Member States have all of this. And it’s up to them now to choose these framework contracts and use them.

Have Member States done this sufficiently?

There are spare capacities. Our framework contracts were based on an initial request for information and still have the potential to contract up to a billion euros worth of 155mm ammunition. And we’re not talking about ready-made purchase, we’re talking about production. What we contract today would be delivered in 12 to 24 months.

In May, we witnessed the first delivery of ammunition purchased through us, based on a contract signed last summer.

We are delivering what they promise, but ultimately it is up to Member States to put their money where their mouth is.

How much is a 155mm round?

There is fluctuation. But it’s definitely a lot more than before the war started. There is no unit price. It can vary between €4,000 and €10,000.

And does your agency have all the industry information to determine what is a fair price?

There is no such thing as a fair price, there is a market price.

Given that there is a war in Ukraine and companies are experiencing increasing demand at a desperate level, do you see this reflected in the market price?

There is an increase in prices, that’s for sure. Growing demand is one factor. But so does the cost of all factors of production in the production chain, such as materials, components, gunpowder, labor, plus inflation. So, fair price… I wouldn’t fall into that category. In fact, I don’t believe that the industry, in general, would be abusing the situation.

This is where the integrity of market information comes into play…

No one has complete information about the industry’s capabilities, about how many have already been delivered to Ukraine. Because it is dispersed. Some Member States are more transparent about what they export to Ukraine, others are less transparent. And in fact, because we are in an environment of commercial competition, producers are also a little cautious in disclosing all costs.

It appears that the plethora of 155mm artillery shell types significantly complicates the effort. In an ideal world, what would you like to change?

Well, in an ideal world, we wouldn’t have a war. But the most important lessons learned from all this are the fact that we are far from ideal normalization. And one thing should not be forgotten: I am sure that what is happening in Ukraine in terms of the use of a multitude of various systems is unprecedented. And now I’m talking about all systems, not just artillery. So this is something that has already been addressed, both in NATO and in our standardization committee, how to really accelerate standardization that leads to interchangeable common ground. This is something we should really take seriously.

What are your thoughts on getting a ‘one size fits all’ 155mm round? Should companies be forced to produce to this standard or carefully incentivized?

Given the majority of private ownership, you cannot force them. It may be easier for companies where states are majority owners. We see this in Russia, how easy it was for them to switch to war economy mode. But here, it is necessary to encourage with resources. It must start with the search, with the definition of flagship projects in areas that are beyond the capacity of a single Member State. There is a top-down element: making the industry work better together, for example by leveraging aggregate demand.

Where do things stand when it comes to improving the integration of EU defense activities with those of NATO?

Firstly, there is no integration with NATO. Cooperation is very limited. And the fundamental problem with EDA and NATO is that we don’t have a security agreement that allows us to exchange confidential information. This is something we must resolve. However, this will require political consent from both sides. And you know that sometimes this can be difficult for well-known political reasons. We are trying to obtain, as a first step, a technical agreement between us and NATO – which governs classified information. Then we will try to conclude an administrative agreement with NATO, which would open paths, in pre-defined areas, for deeper cooperation.